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Background: KenyaÕs healthcare devolution was introduced to enhance the quality of care, user satisfaction, equity, 
and efficiency in service delivery. However, it has since been facing plethora of challenges mostly because healthcare 
workers (HCWs), who play a significant role in achieving health objectives, were neglected during implementation. 
Objectives: This dissertation tries to identify the potential impact of devolution on motivation and satisfaction of 
HCWs in a politicised Kenyan context. In the end, it will aid in formulating policies and recommendations to the 
government that will enhance workerÕs job performance post-devolution. 
Methods: It uses media reports on Kenyan HCWs post-devolution and published academic research on Sub-Sahara 
Africa (SSA) countries decentralisation experiences to aid in inferring the prospective outcomes to the Kenyan context. 
Analysis of the literature aggregates some components of Franco et al.Õs framework with Principal-Agent (P-A) theory 
to aid in clarifying the black box of motivation and satisfaction post-devolution in four broad channels: principal-agent 
relationship, organisation structure, and power and culture.  
Conclusion: A well-coordinated leadership is an indispensable tool that if crystalized together with good supervision 
and proper power play, will influence the achievement the goals of the healthcare system. The government needs to 
improve the Òmotivation factorsÓ such recognition and growth besides promoting professional identity and status of 
HCWs. Kenyan HCWs need value-added culture of monitoring, transparent training and educational opportunities, and 
equal participation opportunities into a new county health administration to be able to achieve healthcare devolution 
objectives. 









Potential Impact of Devolution on 
Motivation and Job Satisfaction of 
Healthcare Workers in Kenya: Lessons from 
early implementation in Kenya and 
experiences of other Sub-Saharan African 
Countries 
1.0 INTRODUCTION  
Qualified, motivated and satisfied healthcare workers (HCWs) are a prerequisite for 
effective healthcare reform whose aim is to enhance the quality of care, user 
satisfaction, equity, and efficiency. Whilst a successful implementation of such reform 
relies heavily on how much support the HCWs receive (Homedes & Ugalde, 2005), 
there is limited attention given to health human resource motivation and satisfaction 
(Franco, Bennett, & Kanfer, 2002; Luboga, Hagopian, Ndiku, Bancroft, & McQuide, 
2011). One such change that is gaining popularity in developing countries is healthcare 
decentralization (Kolehmainen-Aitken, 2004; Kyaddondo & Whyte, 2003), to which 
research by World Bank (WB) has indicated that 63 out of 75 transitional nations with 
over 5 million population have instigated (The World Bank, 2008). 
Decentralisation is a complex, but imperative concept in healthcare management 
(Gilson, Kilima, & Tanner, 1994) that takes on different forms including devolution, de-
concentration, delegation and Privatisation (Malcolm, 1989; A.  Mills, Vaughan, 
Smith, & Tabibzadeh, 1990; Rondinelli & Cheema, 1983). The concept of devolution 
involves the transference of authority and power over public service delivery from 
central government to a semi-autonomous sub-national structure, which aids in the 
management, decision-making, and public planning (Diana, Hollingworth, & Marks, 
2014; Rondinelli & Cheema, 1983). Several Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries have 
implemented different types of decentralisation (Rocaboy, Vaillancourt, & Hugounenq, 
2013). KenyaÕs healthcare devolution was Òone of the most ambitious implemented 
globallyÓ which resulted from the new constitution promulgated in 2010 (The World 
Bank, 2012). It saw the creation of 47 new county administration systems (see 
Appendix 2) that encapsulated in totality the previous regimeÕs arrangements (Kramon 
& Posner, 2011).  
Several theories have been postulated to explain motivation of workers (Adams, 1965; 
Bandura, 1977; Deci, 1975; Hertzberg, Mausner, & Synderman, 1959; Locke & 
Latham, 1984; Maslow, 1954) but none has been used self-sufficiently or in 
combination with the other to explain the impact of devolution on motivation and 
satisfaction of HCW. Moreover, previous academic studies relating to HCW in Kenya 
have mainly focused on the roles of clinical officers (COs), contextual influences of 
motivation, tools to measure motivation (Mbindyo, Blaauw, & English, 2013; P. 









2009). Studies on incentives and retention have been done in developing countries 
(Mathauer & Imhoff, 2006; Ndetei, Khasakhala, & Omolo, 2008; Willis-Shattuck, et al., 
2008). Yet, these studies have not explicitly included analyses of HCW motivation post-
devolution. There is little consideration of how devolution affects HCWs as the 
principal actors who form part of decision-making and determine how resources are 
utilised (Mwenda, 2010). From a multi-level perspective, problems of the HCWs affect 
how they interact with service users and the leaders of healthcare devolution reform 
(Kyaddondo & Whyte, 2003). 
Franco et al. (2002) have equally noted that HCWs are not given enough attention 
during the implementation of reforms and have proposed a framework for instigating 
the correlation of the reforms and the motivation of the HCWs. The framework 
proposes three levels of motivation determinants: individual worker, organisational 
processes, and cultural and/or community influences. The pivotal argument it is based 
on is that workers motivation is the key determinant of the health system performance. 
Therefore, they explore how an individual helps with the achievement of the 
organisational goals. Founded on the framework, there should be equal emphasis on 
other rewards for instance recognition other than a basic focus on financial incentives.  
The framework highlights factors affecting the output of HCWs as a result of the reform 
(in this case devolution). Considering there is limited evidence on HCWs motivation 
and satisfaction in developing countries (Luboga, et al., 2011), this dissertation goes 
beyond identifying the technical determinants of HCW motivation and satisfaction by 
analysing the prospective impact of devolution to motivation, satisfaction and retention 
of doctors and nurses in a highly politicised Kenyan context. The analysis will employ 
Franco et al.Õs differentiation of organisational and cultural variables to fit data finding 
into their model. Nonetheless, this approach will enhance theirs by incorporating the 
Principal-gent (P-A) theory to discuss the concept of monitoring and supervision. The 
discussion will look at the events of early healthcare devolution implementation and 
weave together facts from fiction. All the factors will be grouped in three major topics: 
supervision & monitoring, power & culture, and organisational factors. It will 
demonstrate that by enhancing the three interrelated factors, HCW motivation is likely 
to be enhanced. 
1.1 Background information 
Kenya is a Low Income Country (LIC) in East Africa having a GDP per capita of 865 
USD (Luoma, et al., 2010) and a population of 44.35 million (The World Bank, 2014). 
The average life expectancy is 58 and 61 for male and female respectively (World 
Health Organisation, 2014). High level of poverty coupled with prevalent inequalities 
causes vast economic and health challenges (The World Bank, 2014) evidenced by the 
numerous paradoxes and contrasts. Kenya has a unique mix of population that 
comprises 42 tribes each contributing to the rich culture and diverse heritage.  
After independence, the state adopted hierarchical system managed by the central 
government with the sub-locations, locations, divisions, districts and provincial levels 
acting as the sub-national coordinating units (Rocaboy, et al., 2013). KenyaÕs healthcare 
system was first decentralised in the early 1980s using the District Focus for Rural 









delivery. It aided the central government in budgeting, planning, organising, and 
implementing essential programmes (Chitere & Ireri, 2004; Kibua & Mwabu, 2008). 
Two decades of constitutional review by successive governments characterised by 
several years of lobbying and advocacy from the citizens, development partners, and 
civil society groups (Othieno, 2011) yielded a Òsecond republicÓ that was ushered in on 
4th August, 2010. Sixty-seven percent of Kenyan electorate overwhelmingly endorsed a 
new Constitution in a national public referendum that was later adopted into law on 
August 27th, 2010. At the core of this transformation was the concept of devolution of 
economic and political powers to the newly established 47 semi-autonomous counties, 
which were structured to supplant the prior functions of local, district and provincial 
administrations and managed by elected governors. The counties were fully established 
after the March 2013 election and were responsible for setting priorities, planning, 
budgeting and coordinating implementation of the new Constitution (KPMG 
International., 2013).  
The services devolved to county governments include health, livestock, housing, sports, 
culture, agriculture, fisheries, transport, rural electricity, environmental conservation, 
and lands (KPMG International., 2013). This paper will mainly focus on the healthcare 
devolution whose fundamental pillars are Service delivery systems, leadership and 
governance, health workforce, health financing, health products and terminologies, 
health information, and health infrastructure. In addition, the four-tiered organisations 
of health service delivery are community service, primary care service, county referral 
service, and national referral service (MoMS. & MoPHS., 2011; The World Bank., 
2012) 
The health agenda of the country is headed by the national government whereas 
counties are the main healthcare pillars (N. Njuguna, Thugge, & Otieno, 2011). The 
national government provides guidance on the needed competencies and skills, and 
facility norms in addition to monitoring the distribution and attrition of HCWs. 
Moreover, it develops the policies and the Standard Operation Procedures (SOPs) that 
assess and guide the training of HCWs. On the other hand, the counties are the main 
executioner of the healthcare services and ensures the users get equitable treatment, and 
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County officer for health (COH) works in conjunction with the county director for 
health (CDOH) who is responsible for the technical guidance on health issues and 
supervises three health directorates: planning and monitoring, clinical services, 
preventive and promotive services (see Figure 1). Additionally, the County Health 
Management Team (CHMT) is a technical team which plans, implements, supervises 
and controls the delivery of the health services in the counties (KHSSP., 2012). The 
HCWs are hired by the county governments (LAWS OF KENYA., 2010), and are 
managed by the CHMT. On the other hand, the Sub-County Health Management Team 
manages the primary care facilities, and the Primary Healthcare Management team 
manages the community units as shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 1:  Model organogram of county governments 









Figure 2: Management categories of the health care systems in Kenyan counties 
Source: Adapted from KHSSP (2012) 
1.2 Aims of the paper 
This dissertation explores the potential bearing of devolution on motivation and job 
satisfaction of HCWs in Kenya and formulates recommendations and policies to the 
government on how to enhance workers job performance. Specifically, application of 
emerging literature on devolution from other SSA countries, on one hand, will aid in 
inferring the prospective outcomes to the Kenyan perspective. Examination of media 
reports on doctors and nurses, on the other hand, will assist in understanding what the 
short term results of devolution has been and how it has affected county governments 
since implementation of the New Constitution. The first section of this study has 
introduced the topic, the background, and the aims. Section II will describe the 
methodology of literature search and justification of chosen papers in addition to 
highlighting the chosen frameworks. Section III will analyse the literature on the 
potential impacts of devolution on motivation on HCW using Franco et al.Õs conceptual 
framework. The same section will also use the P-A theory, see (Arrow, 1985; 
Buchanan, 1988; Ludwig, Van Merode, & Groot, 2010; Sekwat, 2000), to highlight the 
changes in workload and supervision of doctors and nurses. Section IV will discuss the 









imperative for the government to effectively plan future healthcare workforce whereas 
Section V is the conclusion. 
2.0 RESEARCH METHOD 
To remain congruent with the subject as outlined previously, qualitative and media 
reports were sought to help gain a nuanced understanding of the devolution process, 
dynamics, impacts and success stories. Since devolution is a topical and relatively new 
issue spanning different disciplines, an expansive search strategy was imperative, and 
experts guide in choosing relevant reading selections was sought. Subsequently, debate 
around this topic shifts more often, therefore, an awareness of the happenings, changing 
political stands, and opinions were maintained throughout the project.  
To be cognizant of the existing gap between the healthcare workforce dynamics and the 
actual service provision resulting from devolution, a detailed KenyaÕs health profile was 
explored thoroughly. The official documents and policy papers were systematically 
accessed from the Ministry of Health (MOH) websites using search words Òdevolution,Ó 
Òhealthcare,Ó Òhealth workers,Ó Òdoctors and nurses.Ó Other relevant policy documents 
were obtained from stakeholders (KPMG, World Bank, and World Health Organisation) 
websites. 
To ensure all reports had covered all aspects, content analysis was employed. Articles 
that had similar themes and concepts were grouped together. The information that was 
obtained from the articles on issues such as culture and power, status, monitoring and 
supervision, employment terms, remuneration, recruitment, training and education were 
clustered together. They were then systematically analysed by copying the relevant 
messages in an excel sheet table and then correlation the information with the Kenyan 
devolution context.  
ExpertÕs opinions (from LSHTM, WHO, and KEMRI Wellcome Trust-Kilifi. These 
were, a professor from LSHTM, and two PhD students from LSHTM but attached to 
WHO and KEMRI Wellcome Trust-Kilifi respectively and were doing studies on 
devolution of Healthcare in Kenya) were used to enhance literature search/ review 
process which spanned a three months period from February to April, 2014.  Key search 
engines, PubMed, Google Scholar, Medline, Africa portal and Africa-Wide Information 
were employed (See Appendix 3 for a summary of the search results). Anticipating that 
there wouldnÕt be many academic articles on this topic given the recent implementation 
of devolution, the range of sources were deliberately broadened to include reports from 
national and International organizations that were published as from 1997 to 2014, and 
media articles on devolution that were written as from 2010 when devolution took 
effect. 
Broader searches using combined phrases such as Òdevolution and decentralisationÓ 
ÒSub-Saharan AfricaÓ Òmotivation and satisfactionÓ Òhealthcare workers, doctors and 
nurses,Ó within Kenya and internationally, yielded some relevant articles. Moreover, 
replacing the phrase ÒSub-Saharan AfricaÓ with the each of the 47 (Kenya was excluded 
from this list since earlier search had revealed no information) SSA country produced 
relevant documents that formed the basis for analysis. Reference list from relevant 









contents in key journals including: public administration and development, Human 
resource for health, Health policy, Journal of health organisation and managing, and 
International journal of health planning and management. The ranges of publishing 
years of the above articles were 2000-2014. 
Grey literature such as briefing papers, presentations, industry reports, and conference 
papers on Kenyan health care devolution, were retrieved through an overall Internet 
search, author-specific, and organisation specific searches. Essential reports were 
equally identified and accessed.  
The key local media houses whose print databases were accessed include Standard 
media group, Nation Media group, Radio Africa media group, K24, and Royal media 
group. Other international media houses whose print media were retrieved are BBC, 
CNN and Aljazeera. Search terms that were used in the media databases were 
Òdevolution,Ó Òhealthcare workers,Ó Òdoctors and nurses.Ó The search produced 
essential information that was used to analyse the prospective behaviour of HCWs. 
2.1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS 
This dissertation is engrained on the assumption that there are several layers of factors 
that interact thereby positively or negatively influencing an individual workerÕs attitude 
in the pursuit of goals and set objectives. These factors are governed and determined by 
the interplay of Òsubjective, relational forcesÓ that are influenced by a change that 
involves a political process. Hence, to help manage how HCWs respond to reforms, it is 
essential that the Òvalue functionsÓ caused by these relational forces is thoroughly 
understood. Bearing the above in mind, Franco et al.Õs framework, particularly the 
organisational and cultural influences, in conjunction with P-A theory were helpful in 
analysing the findings. 
WorkerÕs motivation and job satisfaction are dynamic and multifaceted processes that 
are difficult to understand (Luboga, et al., 2011). To analyse the impact of implemented 
or proposed reform, Franco et al.Õs framework is imperative in un-packaging several 
channels that affect motivation. The framework has three levels of motivation 
determinants which explores how individuals help with the achievement of the 
organisational goals.  
Firstly, the cultural context entails the relationship between culture and patient-provider 
relationship. It describes the factors that shape the decision-making process of the 
organisation besides the acceptable workers level of autonomy. It stresses the fact that 
the community plays a role in influencing individual workersÕ behaviour. A study by 
Kyaddondo and Whyte (2003) further expands the cultural context to include social 
status issues, survival strategies and local politics. 
Secondly, in the analysis of organisational factors, the framework summarises ways in 
which organisational processes, structures, and policies on management of human 
resource interact to impact the motivation of HCWs. Some of the principal structure 
emphasised are incentives, recruitment procedures, staff skills, supervision, and job 
definitions and descriptions. A study by Saide and Stewart (2001) adds insight to the 











(Politicians and CMHT)             
P 
End Users           P 
A       HCWs     A 
KMPDU & 
KNUN         P a 
b 
c 
Figure 3: Showing principal- Agent relationships for Kenyan 
healthcare setting 
Thirdly, on individual workerÕs determinants, the framework recapitulates factors such 
as internal goals and values, self-concepts and variables (including self-efficacy & 
esteem), and cognitive expectations that are essential in influencing job satisfaction and 
work motivation. However, these factors are intrinsic and may be difficult to alter since 
it takes time to modify the internal beliefs of an individual (Ssengooba, et al., 2007). 
Therefore, this dissertation will not consider this component of the framework since 
devolution may not instantaneously enhance the individualÕs factors. 
P-A theory on the other side, is an economic concept in the form of an Òagreement in 
which the principal delegates certain responsibilities to the agent for which the agent 
receives certain rewardsÓ (Ludwig et al., 2010, pg. 291). The ÒagentÓ possesses a utility 
function that he maximises, and that may partly coincide or differ with that of the 
Òprincipal.Ó (Arrow, 1985; Ludwig, et al., 2010). The relationship is affected by 
information asymmetry between the two. Arrow (1985) point out that in the 
relationship, the principal is incapable of determining whether the agent is pursuing a 
personal utility task. Additionally, the principal is unable to judge if the agent is 
fulfilling his own interest or the interest of the principal. In this dissertation, there are 
several agency relationships that is emphasised on as shown in Figure 3. In the figure, 
P stands for Principal while A stands for Agent. The arrows show the three agency 
relationships indicated a, b and c. This dissertation will focus primarily on a but will 














This dissertation proposes to use a new model that combines the two (Franco et al.Õs 
framework and P-A theory) to highlight essential factors that determine the impact of 
motivation and job satisfaction as shown in Figure 4. It will justify that there should be 
equal emphasis on other rewards for instance recognition other than a basic focus on 









3.0 ANALYSIS OF LITERATURE 
This section will analyse thirteen media reports, ten published academic papers, and five 
grey literatures which were the outcome for the literature search. Figure 4 shows a 
model I am proposing to use in fitting this literature and aid in discussing the topic. In 
the figure, devolution is the primary reform with the arrows pointing to four broad 
channels: principal-agent relationship, organisation structure, and power and culture that 
highlight the impact of devolution. Each of the channels has component/s that will form 
the basis for the analysis of literature. The arrows show that the components have a 
positively or negatively influence on motivation and eventually determine work 
performance or job satisfaction.  
Figure 4:  Model of impact of devolution on motivation and satisfaction of HCWs 
derived from evidence used for this study 
 
Source: Adapted from Franco et al. (2002) 
3.1 Principal-agent relationship 
From Figure 3, the agency relationship between HCWs, politicians (governor), and 
CMHT (labelled a) is an inevitable association resulting from the changed hierarchy of 
reporting, monitoring, supervision, and information cascade due to devolution and thus 
will be the pivotal point for discussion in this section. Here the governors delegate some 
responsibility of implementing the new county healthcare policies to their appointees 
making up the CMHT and the supplementary ÒagentsÓ (HCWs- doctors and nurses) 









obliged to operate according to the policy rules set by the governors with the help of 
COH and CDOH. However, they have failed to engage in fulfilling the wishes and the 
rules, for example, the doctors and nurses employed by the counties have been viewing 
themselves as the Òlearned friendsÓ of the medical profession rather than county 
employees who take orders from political elites. Their allegiance has also been sworn to 
their unions Kenya Medical Pharmacists and Dentists Union (KMPDU) and Kenyan 
National Union of Nurses (KNUN) Ð agency labelled b in Figure 3 - from whom they 
take orders especially when the counties are not meeting their salary and work demands 
(Wanja, 2013). 
If the governors appoint COH and CDOH whose intellect and management capabilities 
are inferior to that of the HCWs, there is likelihood for an inefficient and ineffective 
translation of the new devolution policy into reality. These are members who form part 
of the CMHT boards to whom the HCWs are obliged to report to and with the ÒagentsÓ 
having views, ambitions and social status that are different from the Òprincipals,Ó 
monitoring them may be difficult. HCWs are an integral part of the community they 
reside, and their professional identity and social status enhance their social standing. 
However, the new health devolution policy alters this social standing as it empowers the 
CMHT, some of whom are less educated than the nurses and doctors, to monitor the 
performance of the HCWs. Their traditional gate-keeping functions such as being in 
control, leading, and accessing healthcare resources without restrictions has been 
limited. In Uganda, using lay people who had no prior medical knowledge and skills 
and could not interpret any medical jargon to supervise medical and nursing 
professionals (Kyaddondo & Whyte, 2003) had caused some dissatisfaction. Such 
would most probably be the same case in Kenya. 
Devolution has created several hierarchical levels of reporting resulting to more 
principal-agent relations. With each level relying Òon the next level below or beside itÓ 
(Buse et al., 2012, pg. 137), the task of managing ÒagentsÓ is becoming complex. Saide 
and Stewart (2001) reports that in Nampula province Mozambique, the HCWs had no 
problem with who was supervising them and how it was done. However, in Kenya the 
doctors and nurses may have problems with who and how supervision is conducted 
since they feel there are no sufficiently laid down supervisory layouts, guidelines, or 
manuals to guide the process (Kibet, 2014).  
Changing the agency so that the principals are at the county level and not central 
government may makes it easier to monitor whether HCWs spend more time at work or 
not. For example, in Homabay County, the governor makes impromptu visits to county 
public hospitals and even give authority to patients to name and shame the nurses and 
doctors for mistreatment (Okewo, 2014). Whereas in Elgeyo-Marakwet County the 
CDOH takes action against lazy HCWs who abscond duty (Suter, 2013).  As much as in 
Mozambique the transfers of HCWs on punitive ground is avoided (Saide & Stewart, 
2001), there are reported cases in Kenya where some doctors and nurses only attend to 
patients when convenient (Okwany, 2013)  and thus, the close supervision may help 
boost service delivery. However, it might not enhance the motivation and satisfaction of 









3.2 Organisation structure  
Franco et al (2002) notes that there are several channels within organisation structure 
and culture that impact workers motivation and satisfaction. This section will look at 
four broad channels: employment terms, remunerations, training and education, and 
recruitment. 
3.2.1 Employment terms 
Retention and deployment  
Permitting HCWs to choose what county to work in rather than the ones they were 
previously posted in would improve their performance and make it easier to boost their 
motivation. For example, a study by Njuguna et al. (2014) showed that 97.3% of HCWs 
in Garissa County were in preference of working in other counties than the ones they 
were employed in presently. It would likely be easier to enhance the fulfilment rates of 
these workers because there is a direct correlation between satisfaction and intention to 
leave or stay at a certain work location (Luboga, et al., 2011). However, there may be 
problems with such deployments due to administrative glitches, central governments 
interference with transfers, and financial issues as it is reported in Mozambique (Saide 
& Stewart, 2001). Nevertheless, a different picture is painted in  China (China has been 
used here as a good example of deployment and retention yet it is not in SSA)  where 
the outcome of healthcare was successful because of retained experienced personnel in 
government jobs after devolution (Wang, Collins, Tang, & Martineau, 2002). Zinnen et 
al. (2012) analysed how HCWs responded to decentralisation in Tanzania and reported 
that staff retention was not as difficult as recruitment and posting as long as the workers 
were in place and remunerated adequately. Therefore, there should be a balance 
between posting healthcare workers to counties of their choice and the needs of the area 
that should also match the governmentÕs financial budget and objectives. Experience 
plays a key role and should be put in consideration when deploying and retaining staff 
as it is key to heightening the work morale of other newcomers in the area who learn 
from the already existing players. 
Pension  
Changing the management of retirement benefits from the central to county government 
is likely to ease the tracking of employeesÕ information. A study in Tanzania districts, 
see (Zinnen, Paul, Mwisongo, Nyato, & Robert, 2012), revealed that pension was a 
crucial motivator of HCWs and, therefore, good administration was imperative. This 
assertion was augmented by a Mozambique study which had shown that 
decentralisation had improved the management of personnel information thereby 
enriching the retirement process (Saide & Stewart, 2001). However, problems of central 
governments interference may be a concern for Kenya as the implementation of the 
devolution is still a new concept and the capacity of the counties is still a test. Aside 
from improving the management of pensions, caution on counties political 
responsibility and autonomy on pension is needed to enhance the step by step 
implementation and thereby ensure efficient satisfaction and motivation.  
3.2.2 Remuneration 
Devolving the remuneration authority to the county governments will most likely delay 
the wages of the HCWs, introduce inequalities in payment and reduce the level of 









decentralisation had reduced the staff income and that some workers in Tororo District, 
Uganda had gone for 36 months without receiving a salary. Similar instances are 
evident in the early implementation of devolution in Kenya, for example, in Uasin 
Gishu County nurses threatened to strike over unpaid dues (Lubanga, 2014) whereas 
200 doctors tendered their resignation because of delayed and poor pay (Kibet, 2014). 
Moreover, HCWs in Nakuru county were worried they were not getting paid (Wanja, 
2013).   
While financial spur is an essential motivator, the devolved county governments have 
inadequate incentives to keep their qualified staff (Kimanthi, 2013.) and thus most are 
opting for greener pastures in private hospitals and Non-Governmental organisations 
(NGOs). There is evidence in Tana River and Lamu counties that insufficient hardship 
allowance is causing an acute shortage of doctors and nurses (Nyassy, 2012). It is 
imperative to, nevertheless, note that not all HCWs are moved by financial incentive  
like in Tanzania Kilosa District, only 12% of HCWs are enthused by the incentives 
from decentralised government (Zinnen, et al., 2012). Therefore, other non-financial 
incentives such as improved working conditions, proper supervision, and decent 
schooling for children should not be overlooked. However, not all devolved systems 
have disastrous issues with remuneration. In Busia district Uganda, there was 
improvement in the regularity of salaries after decentralisation but were however 
reportedly low (Kyaddondo and Whyte, 2003).  
On the inequality in the payment, a study in South Africa highlighted that nurses who 
were working for the provincial government received lower salaries compared to their 
counterparts in local authorities (Bachmann & Makan, 1997). Additionally, the 
devolved districts in Uganda paid their health staff dissimilarly since each had set their 
allowances and benefits differently from the central governmentÕs policy (Bossert, 
Beauvais, & Bowser, 2000). It can thus be inferred that devolution will create unequal 
pay for HCWs in different counties thereby creating imbalanced incentives that would 
potentially undermine staff impetus. A particular concern would be creating inequity in 
service provision where the lowly ranked and marginalised counties would risk losing 
qualified personnel and face difficulty employing new ones (discussed below). 
Njuguna et al. (2014) pointed out that there are three schemes of service under which 
nurses in particular are employed: the NGO, Economic stimulus package (ESP), and the 
county governments (formerly employed by Public service commission - PSC - before 
devolution). The ESP nurses earn nearly twice as little as county government nurses, 
while the NGO nurses have better allowances than both despite them having the same 
academic qualifications. The confounding factor for the inequality is the unclear 
contractual terms of service which puts the nurses in uncertainty for their future. An 
imperative question would be whether it is crucial for the central government to control 
staff pay like it is done in Ghana and Zimbabwe, see (A. Mills, Bennett, & Russell, 
2001) or whether county government should boost their capacity to handle the pay. 
3.2.3 Training and education 
Entrusting training opportunities to county governments would most likely improve 
competence and performance of the county HCWs. An interesting case scenario is from 









postulated to enrich the work performance of the HCWs after decentralisation even 
better than financial incentives (Zinnen, et al., 2012).  
However, a hindrance cannot be ruled out in such a set-up due to the challenge of 
raising the funds to train staff, and identifying those who qualify for the opportunities. 
For example, in South Africa, training was hindered by paucity of crucial HCWs 
information and personnel data from the provincial governments after decentralisation 
(Wang, et al., 2002) whereas in  Uganda, the decentralised districts were unable to fund 
their staffs training (Kyaddondo & Whyte, 2003). A separate study, see (Luboga, et al., 
2011), revealed how sundry doctors were frustrated by lack of study leave. In Ghana, 
inadequate financial resource was cited as a barrier to implementing the decentralised 
functions such staff training (Sakyi, Awoonor-Williams, & Adzei, 2011). Besides, the 
Tanzanian Local Government Authority (LGA) which receives in excess of 90% of 
their budget from the central government, found it difficult to prioritise staff training 
especially with the strict restrictions that came with the funds (Frumence, Nyamhanga, 
Mwangu, & Hurtig, 2012). Hence, health devolution may create negative consequences 
in the careers of HCWs principally when qualified staffs do not get opportunities to 
advance their knowhow on innovations and technology. The science of healthcare is a 
growing field that requires a constant upgrade of knowledge and in thus HCWs will feel 
the worth of applying new techniques in treating and managing healthcare. 
3.2.4 Recruitment  
Recruitment procedures  
Counties having complete autonomy in recruitment of HCW without any interference 
from central government will enhance adeptness and raise the value of service. Human 
resource planning is one of the most essential procedures of enhancing motivation in 
any newly devolved system (Ndetei D.M, et al., 2008). Evidence from early 
implementation of devolution in Kenya supplements this assertion, for example, having 
had the authority to hire HCWs, the Samburu county leaders have planned to offer 
incentives to keep their workers in the hardship area (Kimanthi, 2013.). Moreover, 
Kisumu County are recruiting nurses and doctors to the tune of KSh 2.4 billion annually 
(approximately $27.13 million) to boost the numbers (Apollo, 2014) whereas the health 
leaders in  Migori County bettered the HCWs work condition and recruitment (Nation 
media correspondent., 2013). In addition, county leaders in West Pokot county are 
improving retention of their theatre staff by building a theatre worth KSh 28 million 
(Nation Media Correspondent., 2014). Consequently, the workerÕs performance and 
motivation would improve since counties are more aware of their human resource needs 
and would prioritise them adequately. 
Devolved recruitment has enhanced motivation in Uganda (Bossert, et al., 2000). 
Nonetheless, this is not always the case as  some countries have had better motivation 
experience when there is combined centralised and decentralised recruitment for 
example South Africa and Zambia (Bossert, et al., 2000; Wang, et al., 2002). The same 
picture is painted in Kongwa district in Tanzania, see (Frumence, et al., 2012) where  
local authorities only recruits lower cadre staff while the central government recruited 
permanent staff.  A different study, however, see (A. Mills, et al., 2001) revealed that 
Ghana and Zimbabwe worked well with a strong centralised recruitment. Whilst the 









how devolved systems would affect motivation and satisfaction of HCWs but they 
however reveal essential issues that the proponents of healthcare devolution need to put 
into consideration.  
In another front, with the law of demand and supply coming into effect with balancing 
recruitments, a centralised recruitment will enhance the balance of human resource 
between areas with surplus and areas of shortage. Munga et al. (2009) pointed out that 
TanzaniaÕs recruitment was re-centralised to safeguard mainly underdeveloped districts 
losing staff to competitive and vibrant districts.  A decentralised human resource 
allocation is, on the other hand, marred by poor coordination, tribalism (highlighted 
below), and inequalities that impact on HCWs (Conyers, 2007; Munga, Songstad, 
Blystad, & Maestad, 2009).  Other motivation gaps are most likely to exist especially in 
dealing with issues of HCWs, who had previously left work with county governments/ 
central governments and were willing to return. An interesting case is that of 
Mozambique nurses who had their motivation hampered by the recruitment procedure 
of the provincial government that did not give them a leeway back to the provincial 
governments once their NGO contracts expired (Saide & Stewart, 2001). Imperative 
questions of imbalance in the HCW choice of working between the rich and poor 
counties need to be analysed, and a policy reorganised.  
Employment pattern 
It is most likely that devolution of healthcare to the autonomous county government will 
change the patterns of employment and thus impact workers performance and 
motivation. For example, changes in the roles of the purchasers and regulators of 
healthcare in UK (The paper focuses on SSA but here UK is used as a good positive 
case example) - that has an enviable functional devolved system Ð enabled the trusts to 
decide what type and number of staff were resourceful in running the services 
efficiently (Bossert, et al., 2000). This is not the case in other devolved systems such as 
Zambia that experienced difficulties and resistance (Wang, et al., 2002). In Kenya, with 
the counties having the authority to hire HCWs, doctors are of the opinion that seeking 
employment from county governments is detrimental to their livelihood and status 
(discussed above) since the counties are not capable of providing much comfort as the 
central government (Nyassy, 2012). On the contrary, nurses are comfortable seeking 
employment with the counties since their numbers are huge, and several are 
unemployed, unlike the doctors (J. Njuguna, Mwangi, & Kamau, 2014).  
Devolving the authority to hire HCWs will worsen favouritism in deployment especially 
in counties that have dominance of one particular tribe. With the constitution giving the 
county governments the mandate and the authority to hire, transfer, and dismiss HCWs 
(LAWS OF KENYA., 2010), staff who originate from the same counties as the county 
leaders may be preferred and given a lease of life compared to the non-origins. It is 
most likely they will support the policies and goals of the leaders. In Uganda, for 
example, Bossert et al. (2000), argues that there was reduced staff quality due to 
tribalism. In Kenyan setting, it has the potential of demoralising proficient staff who had 
initially been posted to the regions by the central government before devolution as is 
evidenced by Machakos County example, see (Editorial, 2013) where Ònon-residenceÓ 
where moved away from the county. Therefore, issues of tribe and corruption in 









other issues that need to be considered if the devolution proposal is to achieve its 
objective. 
3.3 Power and culture 
Besides organisational structure, politics and culture plays an imperative role in the 
motivation process (Franco, et al., 2002). This section will incorporate and discuss the 
role of power play, which is part of politics, and culture. 
Culture  
HCWs being a fundamental player of the community they reside have a professional 
identity and social status (discussed above) which contributes to their high social ladder. 
Professional identity of the HCWs augments respect from the community (Kyaddondo 
& Whyte, 2003) meaning living in a manner signifying someone of high social status. 
Social-cultural factors including strict patronage were identified as sources of problems 
to implementation of decentralisation in Zimbabwe that degraded the professional 
identity of the workers (Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1998). HCWs would want to dress 
appropriately, pay debts at local shops promptly, educate their children in the best 
schools, and even entertain their visitors adequately that are some of the things the 
communities expect from people of their social standing. It is highly unlikely to achieve 
these needs as several counties have reported slashed allowances of doctors and nurses 
(Hajir, 2014; Kibet, 2014; Nation media correspondent., 2013; Nation Media Group., 
2013), and delayed pay thus reducing their respect and in turn demoralising their efforts.  
Power play  
Healthcare devolution is not politically impartial as it exacerbates political domination 
and interference (Homedes & Ugalde, 2005). An example of the domination is 
evidenced at the KisumuÕs referral hospital where consultants (A consultant is a medical 
specialist in a specific medical field after undertaking a masterÕs degree in medicine.)   
have resigned citing Òinterference from the county government executivesÓ (Apollo, 
2014). Additionally, other reports have shown that frustration from the county 
government health officials has driven doctors away from Garissa, Embu, Kitui, Kisii, 
Tharaka Nithi, Busia and Meru counties (Hajir, 2014). In Tanzania, councillors 
(Councillors are elected political ward leaders who are part of the Local Governing 
Authority)  would influence construction of hospitals in their constituency without 
considering medical staff availability and medical supplies (Frumence, et al., 2012). 
Moreover, Smoke (2008) reveals that local and national power players - in most 
emerging countries Ð sways the decisions of county officials especially if their power is 
perceived to be under threat. Elsewhere in Zimbabwe and Swaziland, local political 
contests affected the devolutionary policies and thus interfered with running of local 
clinics (Andrews & Schroeder, 2003). Therefore, the political intrigues and complex 
relationship between politicians and executives hinder the performance of the HCWs as 
their inputs in the decisions are not sort.  This would push more doctors and nurses 
away from the counties. 
On the contrary, not all political domination has a negative influence; it increases 
political accountability. For example, in West Pokot County, the leaders and county 
executives have prioritised its healthcare provision by building a theatre with 
specialised surgical equipment, aiming at reducing the travelling distance of up to 









hospital (Nation Media Correspondent., 2014). Hence, more HCWs will be motivated to 
stay to work in a well-equipped system. 
Power play between doctors and nurses, on the other hand, may reduce the efficiency 
and the quality of care to the patient and thus alter the motivation.  In Zimbabwe, for 
example, nurses and other HCWs were discontented by the fact that medical officers 
were given an upper hand to help with the management of health facilities despite 
having no formal management training (Wang, et al., 2002). Hence, they did not 
support devolution. In Kenya Garissa County, a medical officer with two years 
experience was put in charge of a referral hospital overlooking other HCWs who had 
amassed a great wealth of experience in management (Information retrieved from 
http://www.kmpdu.org/). There will more likely be tension on the relationship of HCWs 
and will also modify the efforts being put towards improving the livelihood of the 
patient, which eventually may trigger an exodus of HCWs, who perceive their efforts 
are not sufficiently rewarded. 
4.0 DISCUSSION 
It is essential to consider the methodological stand for the high component of the 
negative views expressed before discussing the above literature. Firstly, this report 
looked at the initial perspective of devolution which is facing challenges like any other 
new reform being implemented. Secondly, KenyaÕs devolution process has been 
crowded by hyperbolic narrations of truths and false opinions because of uncertainty 
and expectations from the public and HCWs. However, the proponents of devolution 
may argue that it takes time to analyse the impact of change and that the accurate result 
of HCWs attitude and motivation would be apt after 10- 20 years post-devolution.  
Having synchronised the P-A theory with Franco et al.Õs framework on motivation 
enhanced by reform to highlight on devolution, analysis of published documents on 
decentralisation in SSA and media reports have revealed that there appears to be a 
strong correlation between devolution and motivation and satisfaction. 
Monitoring and Supervision 
In several ways, the professional autonomies of the HCWs may be compromised by 
devolution in several different ways as the finding reveals. Their proficient autonomy 
may be infringed in some counties especially where the governors appoint lay people to 
lead the health care management without the necessary grasp of the technical issues that 
improves service delivery within the health care system. Moreover, having numerous 
and unclear hierarchical reporting points and individuals may confuse the HCWs and 
make it more complicated. Aside from that, close supervision is necessary to allow the 
doctors concentrate on their work and not treat the patients only when they feel like. 
Organisation Structure 
From the findings, reasons such as proximity to their family will enhance the HCWs 
choice of a placement. In addition, workers may be more stable working in places where 
their pension is upheld. Of particular interest are the HCWs who work in remote areas 
and may not only be motivated by the financial incentives, but proper and consistent 









Imhoff, 2006). The freedom of choosing where to work, however, may give the workers 
on over endearing authority that will be hard to maintain.  
Findings on recruitment have shown that it is significant to prioritise the needs of the 
county according to available resources. It gives the leaders an upper hand to determine 
the skill mix (Wang, et al., 2002) that is more cost effective and that they can maintain. 
When there is a balance in healthcare staff, even the workers become motivated to 
perform the allocated functions without any coercion. While issues of centralising and 
decentralising healthcare are still debatable, problems of recruitment have been shown 
to reduce the accomplishment of anticipated health goals and objectives such as 
expanding service coverage and enhancing the possibility placement in remote and 
underserved areas. 
Whereas there is an altered recruitment pattern as a result of devolution, delaying the 
recruitment process may particularly alter the professional development of the nurses 
who because of their immense number, may miss out on opportunities to enhance their 
knowledge and skills (Saide & Stewart, 2001). It has further been shown that the county 
recruitment process may be auxiliary marred by favouritism and tribalism which when 
coupled together with the worst state of corruption in the country (Transparency 
International., 2013), the deployment state would thus reduce the quality of staff in 
counties. When quality is changed, there is deficient service delivery and thus poor 
health outcome. It may further catapult the counties into losing qualified staff whose 
level of motivation is not at par with other countries examples. 
Motivation has a Òcan doÓ component which is affected by inadequate training and 
education (Kyaddondo & Whyte, 2003).  According to Franco et al. (2002, pg. 1261), 
developing the skills and knowledge of staff equips them for better performance and 
thus improves their self-efficacy and eventually motivates them. This analysis has 
shown that counties may be willing to support the education of HCW but challenges 
such as funds may be the main hindrance. Therefore, it will be imperative for the 
counties to work closer with the central government to be able to achieve educational 
success if HCW, especially those in extremely remote area, are to be satisfied with their 
work. However, after education and training, some HCWs may opt for others counties 
with enormous financial power than the training county or better still they may look for 
greener pastures (Dambisya, 2007; Mathauer & Imhoff, 2006). Rules and mandatory 
service to curb this are necessary. 
There are two ways in which deficient and unequal pay affects motivation. Franco and 
colleagues, borrowing from Hertzberg et al. (1959), separate Òmotivating factorsÓ such 
as recognition and growth, which are Òhigh orderÓ elements of performance from 
Òhygiene factorsÓ such as salaries and working conditions which define the 
dissatisfaction level.  As per the findings, good remuneration as a form of recognition 
will help in fulfilling other low order necessities which enhance survival of the HCWs. 
Despite the county leaders having the autonomy to pay the HCWs, the pay rate among 
several HCWs needs to be uniform across different cadres to avoid the conflicts and 
dissatisfaction among the workers. Additionally, proper incentives such as good 
housing, security and hardship allowance is essential to ensuring the workers are 









Culture and Power 
The findings reveal that the interaction with the community members and maintaining 
the professional dignity of the workers is quintessential to enhance their job 
performance. It enables the workers to get an inward satisfaction without necessarily 
developing the survival strategies including having a side job, locum, and 
ÒmoonlightingÓ like it happened in Uganda (Kyaddondo & Whyte, 2003). A positive 
power play has been shown as an effective motivator by giving the leaders an 
opportunity to prioritize developmental plans that the health workers deem efficient. 
Nonetheless, negative power and political energies both from the unions and the 
members interfere with the development agendas.  
 4.1 Policy Implication  
The findings above highlight policy concerns for the county government and the 
national government. Whilst the authority to run the health affairs of the regions remain 
with the county government, the national governments play an essential role in 
developing policy guidelines for the HCWs attraction and  retention, performance 
monitoring, and capacity building (KHSSP., 2012). 
Firstly, devolution is still a new concept in the country and adequate preparation of 
health workers transfer ought to have taken place to avoid the power play and politics of 
disrespecting the status and identity of the HCWs. It is likely to trigger strikes and 
resistance from HCWs and thus interference with devolution and motivation. I however 
acknowledge that the political interference increased number of stakeholders in 
healthcare, and multiplicity of interests after devolution might be difficult to reverse. 
The central government can enforce clear and succinct policy that would help avoid 
conflicts in the reporting hierarchy and that would state precise roles of the principals 
and agents.  
Secondly, to enhance the eminence of health services, increase user satisfaction vis--
vis augmenting workers motivation, the HCWs need more in-service capacity building 
and enhanced supervision. It requires both the county and national government to work 
towards the development of such projects. Besides, the county government needs to 
work closely with the health workers union towards identifying the most beneficial way 
of identifying those to be trained and areas to prioritise training. 
Thirdly, the issues on pension, deployment and recruitment procedures should be 
addressed. It should include working closely with other bodies such as National Social 
Security Fund (NSSF) which determines how other governmentsÕ workers save part of 
their salary for pension and the governmentÕs policy advisors. It is particularly essential 
as it affects other health workers as well and not just doctors and nurses. 
4.2 Limitations of the Study 
Firstly, most articles that matched the inclusion criteria were papers that were published 
in as early as 1997 meaning there are further changes that might have taken place 
between then and 2014. Moreover, the newspaper articles used have not undergone an 
academic review, and some of them might be presenting information that is most likely 
based on hearsay and may not have been researched. However, they are imperative for 









on Kenya articles on devolution after promulgation of the constitution revealed no 
articles. 
Secondly, in as much as some of the papers were relevant, their comparability and 
inclusion may have been limited because of methodological heterogeneity involving the 
study population and design. Furthermore, generalising other countries study to Kenya 
may not have given the most accurate information because of the studies own 
limitations to which the authors had cited and stated to be used with caution and hence 
maybe a potential source of bias for this analysis. It is, therefore, imperative that any 
information obtained from this study is used with caution. 
Lastly, limitations of P-A theory cannot be overlooked. For example, when different 
people want different things as is the case of HCWs, CDOH, and governors, settling on 
a Òtrade-offÓ may prove a daunting task.  Moreover, the theory does not explain issues 
when different cadre of HCWs have different objectives, functions, asymmetry of 
information, and imbalance of power, for example, when either the doctors or nurses are 
so powerful than the other. However, this theory gives us an insight that the complexity 
of the agency relation is affected by the nature and context of the problems.  In essence, 
an organisation and establishment of the proper machinery is needed to improve the 
policy (Buse, Mays, & Walt, 2012). 
4.3 Proposed Future Research 
This study would have particularly benefited from informant interviews or focused 
group discussions with the affected HCWs or the experts to highlight their perception. 
However, that could not happen due to unavoidable circumstances. I would propose that 
this is a gap in this exploration that the future research in this area can take up. Besides, 
other gaps that might be filled by other theories include how to enhance reporting 
feedback and supervision that had few literatures to support. The issue of culture had 
insufficient literature to review and may form a future topic for discussion. 
The framework suggested by Mathauer and Imhoff (2006) may have been beneficial for 
this study but was not used because it only focuses on non-financial incentives and does 
not sufficiently explores other imperative factors that affect motivation and satisfaction.  
4.4 Recommendations 
Every country with a decentralised healthcare system experiences a distinctive human 
resource state that reflects the stage of the reform. Therefore, there is no complete 
blueprint that can work best to enhance the motivation and satisfaction of the HCWs. 
Every county will require a mix factors that will fit best to improve the working of the 
new system aside from ensuring staff are motivated enough to give their best in 
improving service delivery. I, therefore, propose the below strategies to enhance 
motivation:  
I. Develop innovative study courses such as South AfricaÕs Eastern Cape Town 
Course on leadership (Kolehmainen-Aitken, 2004) which would prioritise 
training for the hardworking and academically qualified health workers 
especially those working in remote counties. An independent fund only dealing 
with education and capacity development of HCW should be formed. Part of the 









agreement with the HCWs to avoid migrating from one county to another in 
searching for greener pastures.  
II. Establish better monitoring and supervisory layout, guidelines, and procedures 
that would be used by the local county leaders to monitor the work of the 
HCWs. It should be based on objective supervision to establish and develop a 
high standard and quality of work by the HCWs thereby dropping the rates of 
migration between counties and reducing collision between HCWs and leaders. 
It was successful in South Africa (Kolehmainen-Aitken, 2004). In addition, there 
is a need to employ professional health managers to run the affairs of all county 
hospital as they are not influenced by power play and politics (KHSSP., 2012). 
III. Have an independent commission akin to Teachers Service Commission (TSC) 
(TSC was established in 1957 by the government to help in managing the affairs 
of the teachers. It has been very effective in handling pension, remuneration, 
recruitment and deployment) for HCWs that will centrally control their 
recruitment, pension, and remuneration without necessarily empowering the 
county governments to do so. There might be a political challenge in trying to 
ensure it works. I, however, propose that the county government retains the 
authority to pay workers other allowances such as hardship allowance, and 
incentives to improve work. It has worked well in Ghana and Zimbabwe (Wang, 
2002). Delinking wages has been used very successfully in Rwanda (Mathauer 
& Imhoff, 2006). The commission should work on standardising pay for all 
HCWs. 
IV. Develop a cohesive working environment that permits all HCWs to work 
without any tribal discrimination. Here, the participation of the Central 
government is significant to help with this achievement. A rotational plan of 
work would apply so that each HCW works in one county for a period of three 
years before moving to the next one. The problem is; Kenya is very corrupt, and 
some individuals may manoeuvre their ways out of the remote counties. 
5.0 CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, a well-motivated HCW who is sufficiently incentivised will aid in 
achieving the objectives of devolution such as enhancing userÕs satisfaction and equity, 
improving quality of health service, and boosting efficiency and effectiveness of 
delivering healthcare. To enhance the motivation and satisfaction post-devolution in 
Kenya, there is need for protection, promotion, and enhancement of professional 
identity and status of nurses and doctors. Moreover, the government needs to assess and 
improve Òmotivation factorsÓ such as recognition and growth besides enhancing value-
added culture of monitoring and supervision. Transparent training and educational 
opportunities, and an all inclusive participation by the new county health administration, 
will illuminate the black-box of HCWs motivation and satisfaction post-devolution. 
Furthermore, a well-coordinated leadership is an indispensable tool that if crystallized 
together with quality of activities and proper power play, will influence the achievement 
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Appendix 2: Map of Kenya Showing the 47 County Governments 
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